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Homeless 
Intervention
Staffan Schmidt 
The point is not that there is no stable social world to know, but 
that knowledge of that world contributes to its unstable or mutable 
nature. 
Anthony Giddens 1990
Magma – a paste composed of solid and liquid matter
Random House Dictionary 2006
 
Gothenburg is a place to which I travel, I do not live there. My connection to 
the city is foremost a community of people engaged in artistic research with the 
university as its pivotal point. On one occasion, a couple of years before joining 
the Intervention group, I came to eavesdrop the discussion on Södra Älvstranden. 
While working on a project connecting the gentrification of the waterfront to 
the million-housing suburbs in Malmö, I happened to hear the dominant social 
democratic politician in Gothenburg, Göran Johansson. In talking about his 
expectations for the Södra Älvstranden area, he claimed that the city of 
Gothenburg could afford a different planning process than simply a strictly 
commercial since it owned most, if not all, of the ground. At that time Henry 
Lefebvre heavily influenced me, and I was duly impressed: at last a politician 
that cared for a democratic production of space. After that I was again 
disconnected from the discussions. 
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It is fair to say that the context to the following text is sharing the disappointment 
and frustrations with those in the group that have been more closely involved 
in the planning process. They felt marginalized, kicked out, bereft of their hopes 
for and seemingly relevant expectations of making a difference. I sympathize 
with their engagement, but still: I could embrace the role as a passer-by in 
Gothenburg. Without any insight in previous decision-making processes in the 
planning of the city I just accept what I walk by as a fact. It seems easy and 
perhaps also attractive and privileged to stay with an anonymous, constantly 
moving and visual relationship to a city: the onlooker’s laissez faire. This 
relation could continue indefinitely as long as I did not have to stop and ask for 
something essential – such as a place to live. Then it would be very hard for me 
to persuade the city in all its detailed particularities to abandon its anonymous 
visuality and start to answer to my needs. So, there is more than one thing 
missing in this picture.
In this essay I intend to tap into the process as I understood it, but from a 
position that remains a problem: homelessness. I am not blind to the existence 
of homeless people in the city, but I can not share their experience the way I 
share sentiments with my peers. To be more specific, I intend to discuss 
homelessness in a, if you like, homeless manner: setting up, testing and letting 
go of four ideas that I believe have an impact on their situation. The first 
thought figure identifies power with the capacity to “stretch”, or to halt, change 
in space over time. The second figure describes societal cohesion in terms of 
social contract to which not everybody is invited. The third figure finds a 
connection between identification with hierarchies and authoritarian practices. 
The fourth and final thought figure understands homelessness and people 
without property as a real challenge to the idea of the liberal subject. 
I am working my way though this material without the intension of reaching 
a unifying conclusion – I will not be able to move into the ideas I present, to 
take cover in them and to furnish them as my ideological home. My intention 
is to look for real and potential practices that overlap and interconnect, 
institutional practices that I constantly make use of and that help me navigate 
through the everyday. My essay starts from an in-between, between planning 
processes and built space. As such it does not exert the power to do what is 
needed. What I really need is solidly democratic politics for housing that respect 
the individuals’ right to self-definition. I need a housing politics that are creative 
in connecting collective resources to individual influence, and actively strives to 
include groups regularly defined out of the housing equation. Those steps 
could only be taken in an inclusive democratic process. 
*
The world and what I know about the world is in a state of continuous change: 
what does experience count for and who is the subject of that experience? I 
need, first of all, to make a distinction between different understandings of 
experience. On the one hand experience can be defined as a radically open 
physiological capacity, and, on the other hand, both experience and also 
memory could be seen as the result of socialization or social training within a 
historical order that in itself is conventional and historically constructed, and 
thus changeable. Pointing to the gap between these different conceptions of 
experience does not amount to supporting dualism. Rather, the world as I know 
it is, according to the philosopher Cornelius Castoriadis, formed as a magmatic 
social imaginary “based” on the indeterminate relation between the world as 
presented by the sensory apparatus and the world as a historically constructed 
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artifact. The sociologist Pierre Bourdieu called this reciprocal in-between 
habitus, another sociologist, Anthony Giddens, calls it structuration; a world 
both embodied as well as practiced, and a product of social conventions. 
Freedom and agency exsist in that indeterminate distance between the world as 
an open reality and the world as social construction. I leave my experiences, as 
the produce of socialization, to be reflected by the institutional thought 
collectives. The concept of socially institutionalized experience suggests, in a 
reciprocal move, the opposite of magma: a stable world conveyed to me through 
recognizable and ideally unchangeable discourses. Institutions “lean on” nature 
in a complex way, so that what is understood as the natural world is only what 
is posited by society: sensual capacity “is so only by being formed and transformed 
in and through social institution” 
this formation-transformation is actual, figured-presentified in 
and through modifications of the sensible world: so that, finally, the 
very thing which is leaned on is altered by society by the very fact of 
this leaning on – which has strictly no equivalent in the physical 
world.1 
Experience may be discussed using different terminologies in which I orient my 
conceptual framework through both my use of language and also my 
associations and interactions with people and the things I move around. 
Aesthetic experience is no doubt institutionally coded – thought patterns which 
draw on the suggestion – which is produced by art, and the artworld – that 
there is a stable, real reality to be found beyond the code: the “rock of sensation”, 
or, second best, an experience mediated by the artist that can be purchased and 
privatized by another individual. If reality is constructed – then the correlation 
between what is experienced and what is expressed is temporary and contingent. 
If experience and the subject itself is, as psychoanalysis argues, inserted in-
between the individual and the collective, balances between being socially 
structured and being “merely individual facts”2 – then in the final analysis, 
manifest action is never entirely reasoned. If experience is equivalent to reason 
then there is nothing extrinsic to following any flow, and passivity is the height 
to reach. If experience is made up of a flock of sensual data, which always follows 
the closest pied piper narration at hand – then there is no use fighting against 
the misuse of information. If experience is situational it cannot be abstracted 
from politics – I must appreciate the politics of sensuality and practice, made 
manifest in buildings and planning processes, and re-politicize all concepts 
provided by the thought collective. The experience “of history is not to consider 
it from the outside as a finished object in front of us”3; instead it is tangled up 
in the language and concepts created by institutions. A situated understanding 
of experience is engaged in projectively changing descriptive language and 
concepts, to compare their reciprocal workings dialectically – albeit without 
teleology – with a horizon of equality. 
My position is that I need to follow experience all the way to the emergence 
of language enunciating-erasing the singular subject, but doing that does not 
supplant the need for an intervention into the present order of things on behalf 
of the homeless and other marginalized groups that must be manifested at the 
same instant as it is enunciated: an experience which is practiced. Institutions 
move at a slower pace. Experience, before it becomes socially codified, is indi-
scriminate and in a flux; it is magmatic and impossible to qualify in terms of 
(essentially or mimetically) “real” and “proper” (the right thing in the right 
place). It will even be hard to separate out who is having what experience: 
1. Castoriadis (1987: 354) 
2. Jameson (1977: 338)
3. Castoriadis (1997: 33)
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whether it is me or a collective we – it is an example of privatization and com-
modification to separate and privilege one experience over another. It might be 
helpful and useful but nevertheless misleading to build a society in the image of 
a properly institutionalized experience. Not all stabilities and equilibriums are 
desirable. 
Vested interests in spatial production and obsessed with normality, 
mainstream media conveniently produce fantasies and/or social imaginary in 
order to promote economically productive and historically “given” prerequisites 
to a self-reflective middle-class, caught up in the “privatization of experience”4. 
As a group, the middle class always fearing to become exposed to the experience 
of what is, then again, institutionally produced as experience: the uncanny 
position of the hurting individual, the outskirts of collective societal experience, 
the window shopping of life as it is supposedly lived. In short: what is feared is 
the experience in and of the other side of society. This is why I am looking at the 
homeless in relation Södra Älvstranden. I do not share or try to emulate their 
experience as individuals, but I do not think that I am all together severed from 
it, as though I were not connected with it at all. Castoriadis holds that 
“individuals and things are social creations – both in general and in the 
particular form that they take in any given society”5. Furthermore he argues 
that “[w]e are all, in the first place, walking complementary fragments of the 
institution of our society – its ‘total parts’”6. Even though the distribution of 
the negative experiences I am discussing here is socially coded, I find it 
interesting that experience must be dealt with in institutional categories such as 
“other”, “we”, “normal”, “different”, when all experience is possible to everyone: 
there are socio-sensual facts – to suffer injustice or an insulting treatment, to be 
identified as deviant by unsympathetic people, causes pain and that make us 
social equals. Socially institutionalized experience has taught me to turn away 
from and not listen to – or smell – the presence of certain people. I may think 
that I do not know much about homelessness, but I am knowledgeable enough 
to know what to avoid, and I am extremely good at picking up that which differs 
from what I consider normal. I know about difference, and I may reflect on my 
life as a volatile mixture of solid and fluid, but I accept practices only according 
to appropriate codes of institutionalized behavior; as if there are timeless 
universal rules defining the correct and incorrect, pertaining not to be the result 
of social construction and experience. These rules are culturally dominant. 
They clutter our streets with signposts, and any discourse from politics to 
fashion will try to clip on to them. The dominant culture looks for rules instead 
of people: it is not willingly accepting the burden of social magma.
How the concept of socio-sensual facts – not related to Durkheim’s “social 
facts” since socio-sensual facts are constructed and actual at the same time, 
affected by the social world – could make us social equals needs to be discussed 
more thoroughly, in particular since it could be misinterpreted as perpetuating 
the idea of a discretely delimited subject acting in a world discretely objective. 
An experience understood as socio-sensual facts indicate that the categories of 
“subject” and “world” both are social constructs, and that any delimitation 
between subject and world is conventional. Michel de Certeau has, in an 
unorthodox way, studied the role memory plays in the link between subjectivity, 
the built environment, time and the other. Memory arises ”from the other (a 
circumstance)”7, and is involuntarily performed as an act of witnessing in 
connection to space. de Certeau’s concept of memory marks the fluctuating 
border between a conventional understanding of subject as ”supported” or 
”reflected” by memory and the relationship to the subject as materialized other 
(or circumstance) in a given context. The subject is inscribed through its 
4. Rustin (1982: 72)
5. Castoriadis (1997: 6)
6. Castoriadis (1997: 7)
7.  Certeau (1984: 86)
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foreignness no matter what the circumstances. It is not the subject that 
remembers itself, it is space that remembers the subject as difference and brings 
it into its domain: ”this implantation is neither located nor determined by 
memory-knowledge”8.
The position of the socially other is unavoidably an uneasy one. I am not 
interested in investing the figure of the homeless with the distinguished features 
of the noble savage, the unfettered human, or representing them as to emulate 
the “man of sorrows”, “one from whom men hide their face”9. I fear that most 
people share a part of an unworthy life in our present social and economical 
organization, without the right of self-definition. I am, with the term of 
Cornelius Castoriadis, all immersed in the magma of the social imaginary. 
Magma is a metaphor that suggests instability, volatile and destructive outbreaks, 
but also cooling down processes and the formation of layered new ground. As 
a metaphor for experience magma could be at risk of becoming a distanced: 
instead of marking out the possibilities for agency and change, it could be 
understood as “neutral” descriptive tool that is unable to discriminate between 
virtual and real, social construction and existence. Magma needs constantly to 
be supplemented by a discourse of equality that is fundamentally different 
from the liberal discourse on multiculturalism: its strength is pointing to the 
man-measured relation to the open-ended flow of sensual data.
In artistic research there is neither a necessarily disciplining object nor a 
disciplinary tradition. An artistic researcher deals with his or her experience, 
but does not know much: he or she is not defined as an expert in an academic 
sense. Artistic research is – and in this it is historically similar to other emergent 
fields – suspectible to self-reflexivity, different from artistic traditions which 
have historically been used in discussions intended to formulate social 
difference, a difference that becomes socially acceptable through being 
structurally similar to that which is criticized: art generating power from both 
social unapproachability, and conceptual paranoia. Art is a significant concept, 
but what it actually signifies remains perpetually undecided. The social 
structures of institutional recognition which define what is presented as art, 
cannot contain its significance – its magmatic force – either. Art institutions 
smooth out the hiatus between significance and signified, they even try to 
introduce art as essence, hence: paranoia. Artistic research is nurtured by the 
holes, the mismatches and the incompleteness: the primordial readiness to 
accept whatever is given and, transferred from tradition, a naïve willingness to 
look for that which seems satisfyingly final. Why naïve? Because artistic research 
could easily be appropriated as an exemplary knowledge production, combining 
the focus of high-end visual paradigm of neoliberal capitalism with the ease of 
academic credibility provided by institutional distance. Naïve because artistic 
research is also an institutional product – heralded and differentiated by 
institutional coercion and lock-in effects. 
Applying artistic research methods to the city of Gothenburg, the reach of 
the visual will immediately spiral away from the instantly readable into the 
potentially knowable and changeable. It will become necessary to map the city 
as I see it in a set of dimensions that could be described as “lateral”, “temporal”, 
even “immanent”. One quality of visual analysis is that intended and uninten-
tional changes overlap. Structure and agency are interfolded; the planned and 
the self-regulated would be indistinguishable if it was not for the trappings of, 
in Bourdieu’s sense, distinction: the depreciation of that what is produced 
locally in Gothenburg and intended for direct and local use. In the city space, 
changes in the name of stability and changes in the name of disrupting the 
dominant system coexist and continually fluctuate. 
8. Certeau (1984: 86)
9. Isaiah 53-3
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The city map could be understood as the imprint or arrival of self-regulating 
processes and flows, distinction machines beyond social control. It could be 
seen from a singular vertex as in Descartes’ vision of the planned city – an 
empty slate open to what is deemed an uniquely rational improvement; it could 
also be viewed as the battleground, a dialectical force field playing out conflicts 
between social classes. A city map could also, with Castoriadis, be seen as a 
description of an ever-undecided space that harbors a continuous 
creation of democracy and philosophy, both of which break up the 
closure of the hitherto prevailing instituted society and open up a 
space where the activities of thinking and of politics lead to putting 
again and again into question not only the given forms of the social 
institution and of the social representation of the world but the 
possible ground for any such forms.10
Since artistic research is prone to speculation and to call for action when the 
facts on the ground are already established rather than to “point with the whole 
hand”, let us return to practice and do some laboratory work to see what we can 
find about a particular place at a given time – the afore mentioned Södra 
Älvstranden in Gothenburg – with the help of four thought figures.
Four Figures of Thought
The first figure of thought derives from the sociologist Anthony Giddens’ 
description of power as the capacity for change, to be more precise: a stretching 
(alternatively – a cancellation) of the concepts of time and space by which the 
image of power insert itself. History amounts to a “time-space-distanciation in 
which time and space are progressively stretched”11 by power that is always 
looking ahead, producing society in the name of absentees, always producing 
forward-looking space, through which individuals are produced and the 
immediacy of life is lost. The power to stretch is one key figure. Stretching is 
“equated with the existence of continuity, which, in turn, is closely related to 
routine”12. Time itself cannot be “grasped, defined or specified”13, “Social systems 
have to be stretched across it, while it destroys its elements”14. Stretching can be 
perhaps boiled down to the power of presenting change as continuity. Our 
Intervention project, being outspokenly involved in the aftermath of a planning 
process at Södra Älvstranden in Gothenburg, must critically examine the ideas 
embedded, from the level of a single house to the space as a whole. In other 
words, to look into the power of stretching as it unfolds in space and touches 
on the intended “users”.
This thought figure of stretching is not far from Henri Lefebvre’s idea of an 
ongoing production of space15, which he introduces in order to understand how 
the focus of the capitalist system gradually became less focused on the 
production of objects, and more on its implementation in spatial terms. This 
idea has possibly less to do with real estate, and perhaps more to do with the 
“turn”, the change of public space into a piecemeal space of persuasion – 
including the Internet – and a systemic appropriation, through branding, of 
general necessities such as clothes and food. 
Without a discourse of equality, artistic research could be at risk of emer-
ging as an agent of interdisciplinary and lateral stretching, which runs from a 
simulacrum of the high modernist credo “from art to politics” (aesthetics – or 
barbarism) via the declaration of the 1960s “from politics to art” (form follows 
agenda) to the current self-reflexive position: “art stretched to fit a superior 
position in the knowledge industry” (indefinitely academic). 
10. Castoriadis (1997: 17)
11.  Callinicos (1985: 150)
12.  Elchardus (1996: 87)
13.  Elchardus (1996: 93)
14.  Elchardus (1996: 83)
15.  Lefebvre (1991)
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The structuration of all social systems occur in time-space, but also 
’brackets’ time-space relations; every social system in some way 
’stretches’ across time and space. Time-space distanciation refers to 
the modes in which such ’stretching’ takes place or, to shift the me-
taphor slightly, how social systems are ’embedded’ in time and 
space.16
The second thought figure derives from the philosopher Margaret Gilbert and 
her references to the theories of social contract, in particular is the ideas of 
“joint decision” and “political obligation” in understanding the outcome of a 
complex planning process. Within her framework, the agency to (positive) 
change and (needed) empowerment will only appear in and through a recipro-
cal relation of mutual and equal recognition. A central task of Gilbert’s argu-
ment is then to sort out the relations between the individual and the group. She 
seems to suggest that the subject does not have to relinquish its responsibility 
over the group, because a joint commitment must be reciprocal and interde-
pendent before it works, in a simple and beautiful metaphor, like a “string that 
they hold taut between them”17: 
As the parties to a joint commitment understand, they are indivi-
dually committed in the sense that each individually has a com-
mitment. Nonetheless, these commitments are seen to flow from the 
joint commitment.18
Joint commitment as a motivation for joint action is both rooted in and is also 
relative to the idea of having something in common. For as long as the “string” 
is respected and exists, so to speak, from both ends, there is something in com-
mon and the joint commitment keeps “flowing” from the string itself.
the parties to a joint decision “jointly accept” that such and such is 
to be done by one or more of them. Joint acceptance, in the relevant 
sense, requires what I call a ‘joint commitment’. There must be a 
joint commitment jointly to accept that such and such or, alterna-
tively, to accept that such and such as a body. When there is a joint 
commitment between two or more parties, there is what I call a 
‘plural subject’ or a (collective) ‘we’.19
A third thought figure relates to the mark left on the everyday, in particular on 
the built environment, by the belief in authority guiding the individual’s 
relation to the “other”. The dominant view of refugees, immigrants and 
homeless are, as the psychologist Alexandra Snellman has shown in her 
dissertation Social hierarchies, prejudices and discrimination, more related to 
hierarchies than prejudices. The thesis is that social dominance is related to the 
identification with “manly social behavior”, and, further, that a supportive view 
of and belief in hierarchies motivates the biased sanctioning of “others”. 
Prejudice and discrimination based on ethnicity and gender 
influence the everyday lives of people all over the world. They affect 
our thinking about other people and ourselves, which in turn may 
give us different opportunities and different behaviours. Prejudice 
can be shown as an intergroup phenomenon that inhibits contacts 
between different social groups. Intergroup contacts and prejudice 
will also have different effects if the groups are equal in social and 
16. Giddens (1981:4)
17. Gilbert (1993: 693)
18. Gilbert (1993: 693)
19. Gilbert (1993: 691)
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economic status or if they are on different levels in a social hierarchy. 
This is because social hierarchies make discrimination of 
subordinated groups possible.20
The fourth and last thought figure is adopted from Jeremy Waldron, a law 
professor at New York University, who in an essay inquired into “the underlying 
freedom of those who are condemned by poverty to walk the streets and sleep 
in the open”21. A fundamental prerequisite for any person to practice his or her 
freedom is to be able to move freely through physical space. To be free in any 
meaningful sense would also entail having access to his or her own place; a 
tenement. A fundamental idea in neoliberalism is that anything, let us say an 
apartment, has no value unless someone owns it. Ownership – which could be 
objects as under the regime of liberal capitalism, or commodified experience as 
under neoliberal capitalism – unites value and subjectivity: ownership grant 
the individual the lawful right to close the door or open it to anyone.
The liberal individual was the invention of the Enlightenment; the subject 
was a sovereign among sovereigns by birthright as an act of God, but the 
particular individual, in a world of individuals should, because of rational 
justification beyond the “whims” of desire, give up some of his/her powers to 
government, so that a society could be formed regulated by a contract – a 
compromise with “the just consent of the governed”22. What would be the 
ultimate rationality, beyond individualism, is not said outright. There is a 
perhaps liberating, perhaps pacifying lack of any measure beyond the general 
concepts of freedom, independence and liberty. In the neoliberal understanding 
of the subject, nothing of value could be created that is not economically viable. 
Value is a prescribed social measure; something (a commodity, a person) is 
worth what someone (the consumer) is willing to pay. Beyond this there is only 
irrationality and false pretense. 
For the individual there can be no other attachments than a calculable 
economical rationality; whoever readily accepts personal gain as his or her 
measure upholds the predictability promised by the “image of a particular kind 
of unattached and unbiased neoliberal subject”23. This is how the possibility of 
consumption in neoliberal governance is what makes us all equals. In an effort 
to interpret the neoliberal situation John Comaroff argues that the “diffuse 
concerns about cultural integrity and communal survival are vested in ‘private’ 
anxieties” and this is the reason why the fetus becomes the “neoliberal subject 
par excellence”24. The subject is given and fixed in the liberal (and neoliberal) 
tradition: the relation between the subject and the other may, in both liberalism 
and neoliberalism be described as a zero-sum game; we communicate either by 
gaining or losing from this relationship.
Under neoliberalism both the national and the municipal government cease 
to be democratic and regress to 19th century forms of power distribution (where 
power is based on economic influence). The neoliberal state implements this 
distribution of power under market definitions of progress and security. Mobility, 
or in other words to travel with the torrential flow of goods and capital, is 
celebrated as a societal ideal. Just as the economical potential of 19th century 
railways was reflected in the popularity of the rollercoaster, inter-European 
flight tickets are now sold for the equivalent of a subway fare. Conversely, cities 
are planned and developed with the ideal of reducing or even stopping the 
mobility of certain groups – homeless, immigrants – that for varying general 
reasons are deemed to not be entitled to the city space on the same terms as 
everyone else. These limitations that enter into the planning processes are 
20. Snellman, (2007: 7)
21. Waldron (1991)
22. The Declaration of 
Independence, 1776
23. Gökariksel and Mitchell 
(2005: 159)
24. Comaroff and Comaroff 
(2001: 16)
83
labeled and even marketed as “security” measures25. The decisions that produce 
the unwanted are designed in the interest of land- and real estate owners. The 
underlying idea is that security creates loyal tenants and is beneficial in creating 
rent gaps. 
As If To Conclude
Bringing these thought figures together I will not end up with one complete 
and unitary theory: what I see is rather the city as an image heavily invested by 
a political power, that creates “a string to hold taut”. This non-symmetrical set 
of strings – manifested in the production of space and through that the pre-
accumulation of time – aims at reproducing clients as “voting hands”, whose 
political participation is both predetermined and limited. The string (or set of 
strings) in this power and institution-oriented version, is not intended to create 
a reciprocal situation where anyone is entitled to grab the other end, but it is 
stretched out to fix a specific subject according to the default delimitations of 
the liberal subject and the neoliberal economy. Power stretches out in the name 
of a gift, for instance from the Södra Älvstranden Corporation to the city of 
Gothenburg. The gift will reflect the sender’s will to create the receiving subjects 
and their self-definition. 
Let us, for a moment, stay with the concept of the gift. There are gifts which 
are given in such a way that they appear from an undesignated point in time 
and space, just like the casual meeting with the other on a busy street displaces 
and changes thinking. This is the gift that, like memory in de Certeau’s sense, 
displaces the distinction between subject and object. The gift we are discussing 
here is related to an institutionally proscribed need, a need that is socially rela-
ted to commodity. The gift as commodity is an indispensable part of the market 
as the commodity presented delivers an insult as a gift. Thus, the gift is directly 
related to money – by which you incarnate that which the commodity promises 
– as the defining measure of the value of a person. 
The gift as commodity alleges that you, appearing as a value-seeking 
individual consumer, are lacking an “updated” understanding of the “eternal” 
social “laws”; that you are living in want. The insult of the commodity is 
presented to you in the shop windows in Gothenburg’s main mall Nordstan, or 
in the shop window of television commercials or in the torrents of junk mail, 
as a gift, as something through which you are given the opportunity to accept 
the help from the benevolent commodity producers to ameliorate yourself and 
your life. This commodified order of the gift could perhaps be described in 
terms of the anthropologist Marshall Sahlins as “negative reciprocity”26. The 
mall as the site of gifting-as-insult is a typical environment in which the 
homeless spend time, since it provides some shelter but also, as a private space 
retains some public functions, such as for instance being a passage. I would 
argue that the homeless, in spite of being traumatized, are in no way more 
vulnerable to the socio-sensual facts than anyone else when it comes to 
commodity as gift. I would further argue that, historically, the gift from those 
in power in the form of a magnificent building project has been the most 
sophisticated and long-lived insults of all. When those in power in a dominant 
culture present a gift, then a specific use of the “utility” of the gift by the 
individual symbolizes a “unity” between giver and receiver, which can be 
expected as a reciprocal answer. The homeless have in this respect nothing to 
offer in return.
There are inhabitants that are never respected as subjects by those in power: 
since the homeless do not own property they cannot be considered as receivers. 
25. Sahlin (2000)
26. Sahlins (1972)
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They will remain, in an unembellished way, clients of the system. The homeless 
will be the “missing hands” because they are both prevented from, and also 
unable to take the string and become part of the fellowship of stretched power. 
Why? Because they cannot influence their own situation through changing it in 
practical terms, for example an address to receive a voting card and a place to 
keep it, nor are they able to change the perception that others have of them. 
What would a practical architectural solution to this problem look like? How 
could society, in the planning process for a new section of a city, plan for those 
who can be said to have decided to stay on its fringes, let alone to change the 
planning and consultation process from influence through property ownership 
to involve anyone because sharing a place socio-sensually entitles to rights and 
freedoms?
I suspect that the thought figures I have been laboring over describe a lacuna 
in the liberal subject; the subject who is given rights must be compared to a set 
of social conventions and norms and must be deemed qualified according to 
these norms to be qualified to receive these rights. There are also restricted 
areas and situations for subjects to receive that to which they are entitled. The 
current social normality denies dependence and weakness so that the economy 
may thrive on it: stretching immediate relations by way of the commodification 
of care. I am supposed to contribute to society in economic terms; only those 
who are too young or too old are exempt. If the contribution you make is not 
applicable to the current economical rationality or you refuse to contribute 
under coercive conditions, then you are in trouble. The social norms inform us 
to leave people alone in order to respect their individuality – let there be artists!, 
let there be homeless! – or to accept dependence and see the concept of the 
liberal subject come crashing down. 
The right to self-definition is not to be confused with the possibility to be 
natural, normal or even genuine, etc. Seeing the world as an imaginary 
institution makes politics ever more needed; it is about being socially 
constructive, or in other words, accepting the synthetic and constructed as an 
actual reality. To define the self is to project self outside of the imaginary self – 
to accept the self as magma, a “composition of solid and liquid”. It entails a will 
to create oneself differently from what I always already am. This is an ongoing 
process, and the ever-present moment of fluidity is identical to a vulnerable 
openness to the world. The voices and strings extended by others keep me 
balancing on the edge of the void: the natural ways of behavior, the normality 
of the everyday and the sense that I, in the end, possess a solid core. Relying on 
social trappings such as these is really what makes me vulnerable to those who 
capitalize on existential insecurity, who are forcing me to look the other way 
and not see the magmatic nature of subjectivity reflected in the eyes of a 
homeless person: I am readily investing the other with socially conventional 
properties of the other, just to make me safe from the reality – it is a reflection 
of all.
Society condemns the homeless to an undefined and unlimited sentence 
because they remind me of the socialization schemes’ arbitrariness and bruta-
lity – it “privatizes” hardship as to avoid a discussion on structural violence: the 
taboo of neoliberalism. If I choose to think that homeless people have done no 
wrong, then I have to think about stretched power as structural violence, how 
this relates to the newly built environment, and the liberal subject: all which 
currently exists in a cul-de-sac.
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